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Social science reconstruction is needed to explain our vital social issues in a theoretical manner. 
Conceptual differentiations which have laid the foundations of our scientific thought since the era of 
classical German philosophy (such as phenomenon and essence, or form and content, taken in their 
duality and/or final synthesis), provide unchangedly the turning points for our methodical thinking 
and abstract intellectual processing, in variations corresponding to the philosophy and methodology 
of sciences we cultivate in renewed forms today.
The posthumously published synthesising work of GEORGE LUKÁCS made it clear that all social 
descriptions have to reckon with socialisation [Sozialisierung/Vergesellschaftlichung] – and with 
mediation/mediatedness [Vermittlung] within the womb of it – as an unbreakably and irreversibly 
progressing process, capable of erecting, through their historical accumulations, networks that are 
complex in themselves. This is the environment that provides the medium within which objectification 
[Objektivation/Objektivierung] can at all emerge and may turn into an overwhelming power in 
society, and which can produce, in the course of its self-development, the potential and the social 
reality of reification [Verdinglichung] that can yet be accepted as functional in social workings, and 
of alienation [Entfremdung] which is already to be seen as dysfunctional.
It is known from the time of MAINE’s inquiry into The Ancient Law one and a half centuries ago at the 
latest that various kinds of social formalism have already developed since the earliest social formations 
on, in order to transform human practices and uses more secure and foreseeable, like repetitions within 
a systemic framework, that is, in order to make them more economical. Social science now designates 
this trend as conventionalisation, and symbolises and analyses it within the frame and in terms of 
speech-act theory as its master example. Notwithstanding the fact that LUKÁCS did not enter any such 
field of research, it is by far not a mere chance that by investigating mediations taking place between 
the social total complex and its partial complexes, he emphasised language and law as basic agents of 
mediation, that is, as ones having the sole function to mediate amongst whatever complexes.
Social practices and uses (presupposing co-operation – and thereby also intersubjectivity – by 
their nature) raise, unavoidably for their theoretical explanation, the question once formulated by 
classical English philosophising as the dilemma of the separation and/or unity of ‘body’ and ‘soul’. 
For considering either the formal reconstruction of language (as achieved by SAUSSURE) or the 
simultaneously differing aspects of law (as revealed by both the clash between KELSEN and EHRLICH 
in their search for the law’s final criterion and POUND’s sociologism making the distinction between 
‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’), analysis needs the presumption of some construction or constructed 
structure, on the one hand, albeit it is widely known that actual operation will always break it through, 
on the other. Otherwise speaking, practical operation is a kind of reconventionalisation which is 
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going to be sublated [Aufhebung] at all times. This equals to saying that by incessantly preserving 
and transcending that which is a given [donné] to it, it will continuously make (in)novations as well 
according – as adapted – to its own timely needs.
LUKÁCS once draw the conclusion (also by reinterpreting the debate between MARX and LASSALLE 
on the reception of Roman law) according to which it is the ontological perspective that is primordial 
vis-à-vis the relevance of any purely epistemological approach. Or, one who acts is driven at any time 
by his/her specifically individual conditions under the push of his/her recognition of pressing interests. 
Consequently, just because ideology/ideologisation is part of human societal existence, this is not 
simply an either true or false form of consciousness but one of the organic and necessary components 
of the ontology of social existence. To be short: the way we think in is part of what we truly are. 
Accordingly, so-called juristic world-view [juristische Weltbild], taken as the deontology of the legal 
profession, is not some accidental and external complementation to law but – be it, characterised 
as prevailing in ENGELS’ time, the case of European continental normativism or the Anglo-Saxon 
pragmatic casualism or case-law method (not to extend our exemplification to other legal traditions as 
well) – it is one of the original factors of what can be truly termed as the law’s social existence.
Self-realising homogenisations are being built by the partial complexes on the heterogeneity of everyday 
practice unceasingly. It is the judicial process as particular reality-(re)construction from the analysis of 
which the author has arrived at the ontologising reformulation of autopoietic theory, originally drafted 
in Chile in explanation of the biological reproduction of cells. As the author concluded therefrom, 
that what is alleged as following social patterns is reproduction and production at the same time, an 
individual combination of preservation and (in)novation up to the point of its being recognised just as 
exemplary pattern-following by its hic et nunc social environment, and thereby also authenticated as 
a given instance of the reconventionalisation of the underlying convention. Or, in law, actual decision 
making can only be modelled by the logic of problem solving, with relatively open chances and within 
a relatively open referential frame, upon which the logic of justification is only building as added to the 
former phase to phase posteriorly, as a kind of feedback in test of control; all this running against the 
usual stand of legal theories which, dreaming about some mechanicity in pattern-following, are only 
able and willing to report on the implementation of the law’s textuality, its sheer realisation in practice. 
Again, the judicial decision is envisioned as a result concludingly drawn and derived from the letters 
of the law (in a manner similar to the inner necessity of chemical extraction) – consequently, insofar as 
the ‘right answer’ is reached, one without alternatives – , albeit there are no in-built necessities here. 
LUKÁCS may have been of the same opinion since he simply designated the settling of the conflict of 
involved interests through the law’s system of fulfilment [Verfüllungssystem] as manipulation.
For comprehension [Verständnis] is again an autopoietical process itself, within the general scheme of 
any hermeneutic process (unless we think in the possibility of a Robinsonian being, already excluded 
by LUKÁCS): it will reach its given form as it will result from the social game (and its just-so-being 
[Gerade-So-Sein]) occurring in the given auditorium (PERELMAN). In point of principle, everyone 
may take part in it and everyone may contribute to forming it. The whole process will lead exactly to 
the result which is still defensible in the given environment as the actual resolution of the conflict of 
interests involved, just because this is the solution that can yet be successfully conventionalised, that 
is, recognised and acknowledged in the given medium and in the awareness of the predispositions 
commonly shared as the individually actualised instance of pattern-following. Accordingly, the 
personal responsibility of the decision maker (and, in the final analysis, the one of all us) is acutely 
prevalent in each case here as well. In fact, we are all accountable independently of the fact that, by 
transferring our responsibility to the quasi-automatic self-operation of our reified structures, we are 
not used to make it conscious as ascribable to us in person.
This is because homogenisations are never self-propelling: they are nurtured in and by social 
heterogeneity. Just in the way as professional languages draw inspiration from language uses within 
the society’s general culture and professionals themselves are undivided humans in the fullness of their 
being, that what is known as the Ausdifferenzierung des Rechts (LUHMANN) can and shall only be 
realised in practice as reflected through our everyday considerations, that is, in the interest of them, 
moreover, in order just to implement them to an optimum feasible degree.
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In sum, we are unavoidably responsible for ourselves and for our human destiny, including, of course, 
the hows and whys, as well as the autonomy, by which we operate our constructs, humanly made for 
humans’ best use.
Keywords: Georg Lukács, socialisation/mediation, objectification/reification/alienation, social 
formalism, language/law, the law's construction/operation, reconventionalisation as autopoiesis, 




I. Lukács and his Ontology  
of the Social Being
1. Categories
The synthesising work of GeorGe 
Lukács (1976) made it clear at its time already 
(Varga 2012a) that social descriptions have 
to reckon with socialisation [Sozialisierung/
Vergesellschaftlichung] – accompanied by, of 
course, mediation/mediatedness [Vermittlung] 
within the womb of it – as an irreversibly and 
unbreakably progressing process, capable of 
erecting, through their historical accumulations, 
networks that are complex in themselves. This 
is the environment that provides the medium 
within which objectification [Objektivation/
Objektivierung] can at all emerge and may turn 
into an overwhelming power in society, and 
which can produce, in the course of its own self-
development, the potential and the social reality 
of reification [Verdinglichung] that can yet be 
accepted as functional in social workings, and of 
alienation [Entfremdung], which is already to be 
seen as dysfunctional.
It is known at the latest from the classical 
time of Maine’s inquiry into The Ancient Law 
one and a half centuries ago (Maine 1876) that 
various kinds of social formalism have already 
developed since the earliest social formations on, 
in order to transform human practices and uses 
more secure and foreseeable, like repetitions 
within a systemic framework, that is, in order 
to make them more economical in all senses of 
the word (Lévy-Bruhl 1953). Social science now 
designates this trend as conventionalisation, and 
symbolises – when analysing – it within the frame 
and in terms of speech-act theory as its master 
example. Notwithstanding the fact that Lukács 
did not enter any such field of research, it is by far 
not a mere chance that by investigating mediations 
taking place between the social total complex and 
its partial complexes, he emphasised language 
and law as basic agents of mediation (the first for 
the exclusive chance of social interaction and the 
second for its frameworking regulation), that is, as 
ones having the sole function to mediate amongst 
whatever complexes. This implies the recognition 
that language and law are not to assert, but to 
mediate amongst, values and interests which are 
represented by other complexes in the social total 
complex. Accordingly, what language and law 
may still feature up as own values and interests 
are instrumental at the most – intended either 
to facilitate mediation or to enhance its cultural 
level and demanding character (as also asserted 
by the pope John PauL ii’s personal philosophy, 
Varga 2003).
2. Legal Relevance
Social practices and uses raise the 
question once formulated by classical English 
philosophising as the dilemma of the separation 
and/or unity of ‘body’ and ‘soul’.1 For 
considering either the formal reconstruction of 
language (as achieved by saussure [1916]) or 
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the simultaneously differing aspects of law (as 
revealed by both the clash between keLsen and 
ehrLich in their antagonising search for the 
law’s final criterion [Paulson 1992] and Pound’s 
sociologism having once made the distinction 
between ‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’ [Pound 
1910]), analysis requires the presumption of some 
construction of the subject, on the one hand, 
albeit it is widely known that actual operation 
will always break it through, on the other (Varga 
1973). For motionless, dead language and law, 
as freely erected imagination, can be the issue 
of pure abstraction at the most. One, that what 
is not functioning has no ontological existence 
either. Conversely expressed, two, that what is 
functioning as having ontological existence will 
display some incongruency between ideality and 
actuality necessarily. That is, practical operation 
is a kind of reconventionalisation which is 
going to sublate [aufheben; Aufhebung] its own 
antecedence(s) at all times.
Lukács once draw the conclusion – also 
by reinterpreting the debate between Marx and 
LassaLLe on the nature of the very reception of 
Roman law (Marx 1861) – according to which it is 
the ontological perspective that is primordial vis-
à-vis the relevance of any purely epistemological 
approach. Considering the fact that ideology/
ideologisation is part of human societal existence, 
ideology/ideologisation is not simply an either 
true or false form of consciousness but one of 
the organic and necessary components of the 
ontology of social existence. To be short: the 
way we think in is part of what we truly are. Our 
working consciousness is also co-actor in our 
actions. Accordingly, so-called juristic world-
view [ juristische Weltanschauung/Weltbild], 
taken as the deontology of the legal profession 
(Engels & Kautsky 1887), is not some accidental 
and external complementation to law but – be 
it, characterised as prevailing in enGeLs’ time, 
for instance, the case of European continental 
normativism (of statutory positivism) or the 
Anglo-Saxon pragmatic casualism (of the case-
law method) (as to their different logics, cf. Varga 
2007a) – one of the original factors of the law’s 
social existence.2
Self-organising and self-performing 
homogenisations are being built by the partial 
complexes upon the heterogeneity of everyday 
practice unceasingly. It is the judicial process 
as particular reality-(re)construction from the 
analysis of which the present author has recently 
arrived at the ontologising reformulation of 
autopoietic theory,3 originally drafted in Chile in 
explanation of the biological reproduction of cells 
and, then, generalised as a methodological tool 
for macro-sociological theory, too.4 As concluded 
therefrom, that what is alleged to qualify as 
following social patterns is reproduction and 
production at the same time, that is, an individual 
combination of preservation and (in)novation 
up to the point of all its being recognised just 
as an exemplary pattern-following by the hic 
et nunc social environment, and thereby also 
authenticated as one of the feasible instances 
of the reconventionalisation of the underlying 
convention. Or, this is to say that it is “within 
the canon”, which is hardly else than the timely 
outcome of the self-reconventionalising practice 
itself (Varga 2014).
There is a particular case of double talk in 
law, which is necessary if an action pertaining to 
social heterogeneity is to be performed within, 
as complying with all the added requirements of, 
social homogeneity. Accordingly, actual decision 
making can only be modelled according to the logic 
of problem solving, with relatively open chances 
and within a relatively open referential frame, 
upon which the law’s proper logic of justification 
is only built as added to and projected onto the 
former, phase to phase and only posteriorly, as a 
kind of feedback in test of controlling the genuine 
fulfilment. No need to say that this runs against the 
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stand legal theories are used to take, legal theories 
that, in search for some mechanicity in pattern-
following, are to report on the implementation 
of the law’s textuality, a sheer, direct realisation 
in (or transposition into) practice (Varga 2011a). 
Or, the judicial decision is envisioned as a result 
concludingly derived from the letters of the 
law (similar to the inner necessity of chemical 
extraction). Lukács designated the settling of the 
conflict of involved interests through the law’s 
own system of fulfilment [Verfüllungssystem] as 
mere manipulation, admitting that ontological 
description keeps some striking distance from 
the intimacy and intricacy of any characterisation 
(or acceptable reconstruction) from within.
3. Person and Society
For comprehension [Verständnis] is again an 
autopoietical process within the general scheme 
of any hermeneutic process (unless we think in 
terms of a Robinsonian being, single, and without 
social memory, as from the beginning excluded 
by Lukács). Comprehension will result from 
the social game5 that just happens to occur in 
the given audience (PereLMan 1997, 36). As to 
social games of both the heterogeneous and the 
homogenised fields of action, within which also 
the simultaneous social interaction of “having 
a meaning and giving a meaning” (Perelman 
1962) is to take place, well, in point of principle 
everyone may take part in them and everyone may 
contribute to actually shaping them (even if this 
usually is the prime burden and privilege – and 
also responsibility – of professionals with specific 
competences in modern societies). No doubt that, 
on the final analysis, the whole process will exactly 
lead to the result which is still defensible in the 
given environment as the actual resolution of the 
conflict of interests involved. This is so because 
this is the solution that can yet be – aware of the 
predispositions commonly shared – successfully 
conventionalised, that is, acknowledged in the 
given medium, as the instance of pattern-following 
individually actualised hic et nunc. Accordingly, 
the personal responsibility of the decision maker 
is acutely prevalent in each case here as well. 
In fact, we are all accountable – independently 
of the fact that, by transferring responsibility 
to the quasi-automatic self-operation of reified 
structures, we are not used to make it ascribable 
to anyone in person.
Or, all we act as genuine actors of social 
games, not simply as imputed puppet entities.
In the ontology of natural and social beings 
as well, there are no genuine separations, only 
distinctions or differentiations made in, for the sake 
of, analysis. This is why not even homogenisations 
are truly self-propelling: they are nurtured in 
and by social heterogeneity. Just in the way as 
professional languages draw inspiration from 
everyday language uses and from the society’s 
general culture (and vice versa, as a traffic in 
both senses; Varga 2008a), and as professionals 
themselves always prove to be undivided humans 
in the fullness (possessing all the facultases) of 
their personal being (Varga 2006 & 2010), well, 
that what is known as the Ausdifferenzierung 
des Rechts (LuhMann 1981) – standing for the 
Lukácsian legal homogenisation – can only be 
materialised in practice as reflected through 
everyday considerations, that is, in the interest of 
them, moreover, in order just to implement them 
in practice, to the optimum feasible degree.
Accordingly, in itself reification is hardly 
more than humanly targeted instrumentalisation, 
and alienation, just its already pathologised 
outcome in all-social dimensions, as a kind 
of degeneration due to lack of purposefully 
conscious control.
For constraints as purely external powers can 
only prevail in micro-contextures and at a personal 
level. Their eventual overdimensioning, exerted 
either intellectually, morally or otherwise, allows 
to be exclusively interpreted as their successful 
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use in an overweightily ideological form. Or, this 
is to say that – properly speaking – there are no 
genuine constraints at a societal level, only states 
of affairs that may call for reconsideration by 
opening perspectives to re-assertion or change, 
up to a socially generalisable cry for reform or 
revolution, as the case may be.
In sum, we are unavoidably responsible for 
ourselves and for our human destiny, including 
the how and why we operate our constructs, 
humanly made for humans’ freely selectible best 
use.
II. Outlines of an Ontology of Law
4. Foundational Notions
Reconsidering all the above as reflected on 
law (Varga 1984), social existence is taken as an 
irreversible and unbroken process. In this process 
all that comes about will leave its mark by going 
to be built as a new component in those conditions 
under which the mutual effect of the individual 
complexes and also the self-reproduction of the 
total complex will take place.
Language and law are complexes destined 
to nothing but mediation. As such, none of them 
holds its raison d’être in and by itself. Yet, in 
order to fulfil their mediatory function, they are 
expected to develop relative autonomy.
Seen from a historical perspective, the 
state has ever been taking steps for gradually 
monopolising law, acquiring an exclusive rule 
over law. The étatisation of law is completed 
by such arrangements that separate making 
the law [Rechtssetzung; création du droit; 
правотворчество] and administering justice 
[Rechtsanwendung; application du droit; 
правоприменение] in a formal way, both notionally 
and institutionally. In European history, this has 
been achieved by the development of created, 
written, and formally enacted norm structures, 
intended to embody the law exclusively (Varga 
2011b). This is the scheme whereby the idea of 
ius has been reduced to the mere factuality 
of the lex enacted, i.e., of what has actually 
been promulgated by the temporary legislator 
in a procedurally due form. At the same time, 
however, such a scheme presumes law-making 
to be lifted almost to limitless all-mightiness, to 
a freely fillable space of regulatory power. As a 
consequence, the lex will remain the exclusive 
genuine actor on a legal field, the sole creator of 
what can at all be relevant – and in which sense – 
in law. Thereby, law-making is sharply contrasted 
to law-application, which latter is degraded to a 
merely executive role. In consequence, justice to 
be administered will necessarily degenerate into 
mere formal rule-conformism.
As expressed by keLsen’s Pure Theory 
of Law – emptying methodically the law’s field 
from anything not distinctively legally posited, 
for that the genuinely legal determination of the 
law’s construction and operation can be clearly 
seen – the lawyers’ professional approach to the 
law, alongside with the theoreticians’ exclusively 
conclusive treatment of law, will be exhausted by 
two principles, pertaining to the law’s construction 
and operation respectively. According to them, 
validity is a function of the law being properly 
enacted, and legality is a function of norms and 
facts in any legal process getting subordinated 
to, or drawn in conclusion within, a logified 
normative scheme (Varga 2000 & 1994).
As to its nature, the norm structure developed 
by the over-dominant state is a teleological 
projection which fails to formulate the underlying 
target that is socially desired to reach (Varga 1971 
& 1981). In order to guarantee unequivocality by 
excluding mere questionability, it formulates the 
instrumental behaviour defined by the legislator 
as the target itself that is to be reached and 
sanctioned. This is by which the law stipulates 
the Tatsache – the aggregate of those facts that 
may constitute a case in law6 – so that average 
social attitudes can be foreplanned and effectively 
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reached through prescribing/proscribing (i.e., 
sanctioning in a positive/negative manner) well-
selected instrumental behaviours.
Accordingly, law is expected to fulfil its 
mediatory function by asserting its own relative 
autonomy at the same time. That is, it has to 
realise whatever social targets, transformed into 
legal ones, through meeting the requirements of 
its own system of fulfilment. Hence it follows 
that a definite Janus-facedness, i.e., the practice 
of double talk, will become a necessary corollary 
of lawyers’ activity. For, what they do is, in fact 
and according to Lukács, firstly, to transfigure 
real conflicts of interests into conflicts within 
the law, and then, secondly, to refine even these 
into apparent or quasi-conflicts, that is, into 
instances of a genuine application of law – while 
they seem effectively and exclusively operate 
with legal enactments according to a linguistico-
logical scheme. Therefore, again, what they do 
in actual practice is to manipulate the selection 
of both the “relevant facts” and the “pertinent 
norms”, i.e., their naming accompanied with their 
interpretation and qualification, so that the judicial 
decision can eventually imply a responsible 
social decision under the façade of mere logics. 
This is to mean that logic is hardly more than a 
form of expression in this whole operation here, 
and by far not the ruling medium of reaching the 
decision that is due.
The same conclusion holds for the why and 
how of conceptualisations in law as well. For 
intellectual operations in law are directed to other 
aims than mere cognition. In the final account, 
all they are to serve a pragmatic destination, that 
is, the standardisation of practice:7 to classify 
diverse occurrences, instances and configurations 
of real life situations by pigeonholing them 
into a finite number of cases defined by the 
law. Due to its logically perfect – notional – 
formalism, the qualification according to which 
a given case is considered to be the case of a 
construable combination of selected norms 
has to be achieved completely, up to the formal 
identification of the former with the latter, and 
without exception, hesitation, or anything of the 
ambivalence characteristic of a life lived through, 
that is, without dialectics – in respect of the legal 
consequences which are to be meted out in the 
name and as the provision of the law when the 
decision will have been eventually made.
The law’s self-closure into its own conceptual 
formalism is crowned by that the self-justification 
of law – including the manner of how producing 
and canonising the conditions needed for its valid 
construction and legally viable operation – will 
remain an internal question within the sphere of 
law, made unavailable to any external intervention 
(Varga 2011c).
5. Objectification, Reification, Alienation
Objectification, reification and alienation 
are heterogeneous categories which by no means 
overlap, albeit they are historically embedded 
in the same process: objectification may have a 
stimulative effect on reification, and reification, 
on alienation. The reason for all this is rooted in 
the very nature of social being as an irreversibly 
progressing process, shaped by all its contributing 
components, increasingly socialised and mediated 
themselves. The process is enhanced by the fact 
that man-made second nature – involving a 
variety of disanthropomorphising tendencies8 
in its intellectual processing and ideologisation, 
too – is increasingly coming to the fore in this 
process. Law as a construct and law as a practical 
operation, i.e., the social force of law itself, 
operated within the framework of its socio-
professional deontology, is just a key instance of 
it.
Reification is the objectified functioning 
of the objectifications of social being and/or the 
reflection of such a functioning as an objectified 
one. It is to say that reification is the completion 
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of objectifications, arranged as items within 
a self-organising systemic network. Reified 
functioning and its reified view conform exactly 
to the demands of formal rationality, which 
are especially strong and self-serving in public 
administration and the administration of justice. 
For there is a socio-political and economic call 
for constructing and operating some impersonal, 
quick and safe machinery, suitable to foresee 
and standardise each and every eventuality. This 
is why law has come to existence in the social 
total complex as a specifically heterogeneous 
partial complex, with strong tendency towards 
becoming independent, autotelic, and self-
organising according to its own laws and rules 
(Varga 1978). Reified law produces just the 
ideology that best suits the law’s operation 
according to its own postulates, normative and 
ideological at the same time. One could also say 
that the reified operation of reified structures 
needs and also produces reified consciousness. 
Well, the juristische Weltanschauung taken as the 
deontology of the legal profession – perceiving 
determination by the law in the whole formation 
and net of relationships in society if legally 
arranged – can indeed be seen as the adequate 
reflection of a system turned upside-down. 
Accordingly, an act of unmasking its sheerly 
ideological character would both precondition 
and result in unmasking the law’s aspirations to 
acquire autonomy.9
Law as a reified structure never produces 
the phenomenon of alienation by itself. The total 
motion of the social total complex is needed 
for provoking such an effect; and no social 
arrangement is truly exempt from the chance 
of its materialisation. It is to be recalled at the 
same time, however, that explanation needs 
ontological framework and totality approach 
within it, as there are no factors in isolation or 
in neutrality to other factors that could alone 
produce that effect. For instance, by the law’s 
technicalities, any objectification building into 
the network of other objectifications will through 
continuous interaction only reinforce the system 
of objectifications itself. This is also to say that 
even tendencies not alienated may tend to create 
or strengthen alienation (or the subjective impact 
thereof) in the increasingly differentiated total 
motion of the social total complex. According to 
Lukács, “If modes of social conduct, »innocent« 
in themselves from the point of view of alienation, 
penetrate everyday life deeply, they will increase 
the influencing force of modes of conduct which 
already have a direct effect in this direction; on 
the other hand, the more their life relations are 
abstractedly reified and the less they recognise 
these as concrete and spontaneous process-
like relations, the easier people will fall prey to 
alienation tendencies and the more spontaneously 
and defencelessly will they be attracted to them 
[...]. For the more man’s everyday life produces 
alienating forms and life-situations, the easier 
will the man in the street adjust spiritually 
and without moral resistance to them as to his 
»natural surrounding«, and the resistance of 
average people to really alienating reifications 
will thereby weaken, although not of necessity in 
principle.”10
Modern formal law (Varga 1996) is reified 
a construct whose operation is reified and 
reifying at the same time. At the same time, the 
normativistic deontology of legal practitioners 
and legal theories are equally founded upon 
disanthropomorphised schemes, able to exert 
disanthropomorphising effects themselves. This 
is why the chance of alienation is at the very root 
of modern formal law, independently of whether 
or not there is a political will to transform the law’s 
construction and/or operation into a medium of 
social alienation.
This is meant by Lukács stating that 
although alienation is not “a superhistorically 
general »condition humaine«”, however, 
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“[i]n a certain sense, one may say that the whole 
history of mankind is also the history of human 
alienation ever since a certain degree of the 
division of labour (most probably since pre-
slavery times).”11 Moreover, instead of being 
partial, individual or simply occasional and 
contingent, “alienation can never be an isolated, 
self-contained phenomenon, but an element of 
the economic and social evolution at any time 
and subjectively that of the ideological reactions 
to the state, direction of movement, etc. of the 
society as a whole.”12
In sum, alienation – too – has both its 
origin and its deepening and multiplying effect 
in the interaction of various social complexes, 
of a series of objective and subjective factors 
working in these complexes, in such a way 
that both the process itself and its outcome can 
only be explained by the relative positions their 
components occupy in the social total complex, 
and never in isolation, never per se. Otherwise 
speaking, the totality of social being presupposes 
total interconnections with endless series of all-
covering feedback uninterrupted and of relative 
balance achieved at each time. Accordingly, 
alienation can only be the outcome produced by 
some definite total effect.
All in all, objectification, reification 
and alienation are chances in succession in 
consideration to which the problem of technics, 
thematised with dramatic overtone since the late 
19th century on, has also to be interpreted. And 
certainly, not as the embodiment of some fatality 
but as the potential human self-affirmatory 
emancipation in mastering the mankind’s final 
destiny, using all means available and feasible 
without degeneration into states which may tend 
to become either alienating or alienated.
III. Conclusion
All kinds of “artificial human construction”13 
are susceptible to grow into an independent 
power with the tendency of majoring societal 
life and development in either direction. This 
is why Marxism (hypothesising a historically 
formed human nature or Gattungswesen) does 
not differ basically from the social teaching of 
the Church in their respective platforms (e.g., 
Lubac 1950), both drawing a clear dividing line 
between ultimate values, foundational in and by 
themselves and therefore to be taken as axioms 
valid for, e.g., a given culture or historical epoch, 
on the one hand, and anything else instrumentally 
developed, whose raison d’être needs particular 
justification case to case in each occurrence, on 
the other.
No need to emphasise that alienating 
tendencies may prevail relating to the noblest 
catch-words of our civilisational achievements 
as well. For instance, in Hungary, during the 
transition from dictatorship to the rule of 
law a quarter of a century ago, the law’s past 
annihilation and political relativisation was 
simply replaced by the fetishism of the letter 
of the law, an outcome channeling the entire 
transition to a dead end, replacing the de facto 
past privilege of those ruling politically with a 
new democratic legitimacy ruling economically 
now (Varga 1995 & 2008b). This is to message 
that even the Rule of Law ideal may corrupt by 
the simple gesture of a blind or overdimensioned 
use (Varga 2011d). And the list of examples could 
be continued for long.
This is one of the reasons why legal 
philosophy must not be detached from social 
theorising, arched from anthropology to 
sociology. This is a cry for unifying our social 
concerns, in order to harmonise efforts at building 
kinds of Gesamtplan [total plan], inclusive of all 
targeted social effects and eventual by-effects as 
well, and personal responsibility – all through 
assisted by the principle of subsidiarity with 
all available local and personal autonomies 
involved.
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1 Cf. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind–body_problem> and <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_(philosophy_of_
mind)>, as well as <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/377923/metaphysics/15815/The-soul-mind-and-body>.
2 This is the reason why classical comparative law, conceived of as the mere extension of national legal positivisms them-
selves, is to be transcended–or, at least, to be complemented to–by the comparative investigation of legal cultures and of 
the judicial mind (Varga ed. 1992; Varga 2007b).
3 Benseler (1987) in his review article already signalled the tendency of an autopoietic reconstruction in the way Varga 
(2012a) had in 1985 interpreted the Lukácsian Ontology, with which the author had in fact got acquainted during his 
research at the Australian National University Research School of Social Sciences in 1987 (reported in Varga 1991 & 
2012b).
4 Francisco J. VareLa & huMberto r. Maturana in life sciences, resp. nikLas LuhMann & Gunther teubner in socio-legal 
theorising.
5 As developed from the WittGensteinian notion of Sprachspiel. Cf., e.g., <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language-game>.
6 According to the definition Eisler (1904), „Tatsache (zuerst bei herder) ist das, was durch das Denken sicher als Er-
fahrungsinhalt, als Bestandteil der gesetzlichen Ordnung der Dinge und Ereignisse feststeht. Die »Tatsachen« als solche 
sind nicht einfach »gegeben«, sondern müssen erst auf Grund der Erfahrung methodisch-denkend gesetzt, konstatiert 
werden.” As to its context (Gschnitzer 1992), „1. Rechtssätze bestehn aus Tatbestand und Rechtsfolge (Gesetzesbefehl); 
aus Sein (abstrakter Tatbestand) und Sollen (abstrakte Rechtsfolge). 2. Damit die Rechtsfolge eintritt, muß die konkrete 
Sachlage, der Sachverhalt (der ‘Fall’) unter den abstrakten Tatbestand subsumiert werden können, dh. geprüft werden, 
ob der Sachverhalt die Merkmale des Tatbestandes erfüllt. 3. Eine Tatsache, die allein oder zusammen mit andern eine 
Rechtswirkung herbeiführt, ist eine juristische Tatsache.”
7 The issue of whether or not norm propositions are themselves descriptive statements with truth value suitable to be 
proven or falsified used to be a test of universality of the Leninist reflection theory–standing for the epistemologisation of 
ontology itself–in Central Europe’s communist Marxism in the 1950s and 1960s. Any criticism was held to undermine its 
final truth. For an attempt notwithstanding in 1964, ending in prohibition all through, see Varga 2001.
8 E.g., Lukács tells about “disanthropomorphising thought apparatuses” [„desanthropomorphisierende 
Gedankenapparaturen”]–in Georg Lukács Die wichtigsten Problemkomplexe [M/120 Manuskript at Lukács Archives and 
Library, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest], p. 922–for which law provides a prime exemplification.
9 Lukács’ characterisation of reification being “of purely ideological nature in reality” [„in Wirklichkeit rein ideologischen 
Beschaffenheit” in his MS idem., pp. 161–162] is in contrast with his underlying view of its thoroughly ontological 
[seinhaftige] function and functioning.
10 Idem., p. 298. [„einerseits verstärken vom Standpunkt der Entfremdung an sich »unschuldige« gesellschaftliche 
Verhaltungsarten, wenn sie tief ins Alltagsleben eindringen, die Durchschlagskraft jener, die bereits direkt in dieser 
Hinsicht wirken, andererseits werden die Einzelmenschen desto leichter von Entfremdungstendenzen erfaßbar – man 
könnte sagen: inklinieren desto spontaner und widerstandunfähiger auf diese –, je mehr ihre Lebensbeziehungen 
abstrahierend verdinglicht und nicht als konkret, spontan prozeßhaft wahrgenommen werden [...]. Denn je mehr 
das Alltagsleben der Menschen – vorläufig noch im bisher angegebenen Sinn – verdinglichende Lebensformen und 
Lebenssituationen schafft, desto leichter wird der Mensch des Alltagslebens sich diesen ohne geistig-moralischen 
Widerstand als »Naturgegebenheiten«, geistig anpassen, und dadurch kann im Durchschnitt – ohne prinzipiell notwendig 
zu sein – ein abgeschwächter Widerstand gegen echte, entfremdende Verdinglichungen entstehen.”]
11 Lukács Die wichtigsten Problemkomplexe [MS], p. 15 and p. 573. [„eine allgemeine überhistorische »condition humaine«” 
/ „In bestimmtem Sinn könnte man sagen, daß die ganze Menschheitsgeschichte von einer bestimmten Höhe der 
Arbeitsteilung (wahrscheinlich schon von der der Sklaverei) auch die der menschlichen Entfremdung ist.”] 
12 Idem., p. 755. [„die Entfremdung niemals etwas Isoliertes, Aufsichselbstgestelltes sein kann, sondern objektiv ein Moment 
der jeweiligen ökonomisch-sozialen Entwicklung, subjektiv ebenfalls ein Moment der ideologischen Reaktionen der 
Menschen auf Stand, Bewegungsrichtung etc. der Gesamtgesellschaft ist, muß natürlich auch hier festgehalten bleiben.”]
13 Klaus 1958, 72 terms ‘künstliche menschliche Konstruktionen’ the propositions which, considering their purely praxis-
bound nature, directly have no cognitive contents and–consequently–cannot be taken as either true or false.
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От онтологии общественного бытия  
к онтологии права
Чаба Варга
Католический университет Петера Пазманя 
Венгрия, 1428, Будапешт 8, Почтовый ящик, 6
Реконструкция социальной науки необходима для теоретического объяснения наших 
жизненно важных социальных проблем. Концептуальные дифференциации, которые легли 
в основу нашей научной мысли начиная с эпохи классической немецкой философии (такие 
как феномен и его сущность, или форма и содержание, рассматриваемые в их дуализме и/
или заключительном синтезе), неизменно остаются поворотными точками для нашего 
методического мышления и абстрактной интеллектуальной обработки информации, 
относящиеся к философии и методологии наук, которыми мы сегодня занимаемся в новом 
формате. 
После посмертного объединенного издания работ Дьёрдя Лукача стало ясно, что все 
социальные описания должны принимать во внимание социализацию [Sozialisierung/
Vergesellschaftlichung] и посредничество [Vermittlung] в их истоках – как неразрывный и 
безвозвратно прогрессирующий процесс, способный возводить через свои исторические 
накопления сети, сложные сами по себе. Это окружение, которое создает среду для 
потенциального возникновения объективации [Objektivation/Objektivierung], которая может 
превратиться в всепоглощающую силу в обществе, и которое в ходе своего саморазвития 
создает потенциал и социальную реальность овеществления [Verdinglichung], что может 
быть принято в качестве эффективного в социальных условиях, и отчуждения [Entfremdung], 
которое уже может рассматриваться как неэффективное.
С момента исследования Генри Мэна в работе ««Древнее право» полтора столетия назад 
известно, что различные виды социального формализма уже развиты начиная с самых 
ранних общественных формаций для того, чтобы сделать человеческие традиции и их 
использование более безопасными и предсказуемыми, как повторения в рамках системы, 
т.е. более экономичными. В социологии данная тенденция в настоящее время обозначается 
как конвенционализация, которую характеризуют и анализируют в рамках теории речевого 
акта, используя ее в качестве эталона. Несмотря на то что Лукач не затрагивал эти 
сферы в своих исследованиях, при изучении посредничества между социальным общим 
комплексом и его частичными комплексами он далеко не случайно подчеркнул, что язык и 
право являются основными субъектами посредничества, т.е. выполняют исключительную 
функцию посредника между любыми комплексами. 
Количество социальных традиций и их применение (по своей природе предполагающее 
сотрудничество и в этой связи межсубъективность) растет, независимо от их 
теоретического объяснения: вопрос, сформулированный однажды классической английской 
философией как дилемма разделения и/или единства «тела» и «души». Для рассмотрения 
формальной реконструкции языка (как предложил Соссюр) либо одновременно различных 
аспектов права (как было выявлено Кельзеном и Эрлихом в результате их спора в поиске 
окончательного критерия права и представлено в социологизме Паунда, различающего 
«закон в книге» и «закон в действии»), требуется допущение какой-либо конструкции 
или сконструированной структуры, с одной стороны, хотя, с другой стороны, широко 
известно, что фактическое применение всегда будет ломать ее. Иначе говоря, практическое 
применение является своего рода реконвенционализацией, которая будет упраздняться 
[Aufhebung] во все времена. Это равнозначно тому, что, постоянно сохраняя и превосходя 
то, что ему дано [donné], применение на практике всегда будет вносить (ин)новации, а 
также реализовывать своевременную адаптацию возникающим потребностям.
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Лукач однажды пришел к выводу (также интерпретируя дебаты между Марксом и Лассалем 
на тему принятия римского права), согласно которому это онтологическая перспектива, 
которая является первичной по отношению к актуальности любого чисто гносеологического 
подхода. Или же тот, кто совершает действие, в любое время руководствуется своими 
собственными индивидуальными условиями под давлением признания своих актуальных 
интересов. Следовательно, только потому, что идеология/идеологизация является 
частью существования человека в обществе, это не просто истинная или ложная форма 
сознания, но и один из органических и необходимых компонентов онтологии общественного 
бытия. Проще говоря, то, как мы думаем, является отчасти тем, что мы есть на самом 
деле. Соответственно, так называемое юридическое мировоззрение [Juristische Weltbild], 
принимаемое в качестве деонтологии юридической профессии, – это не какое-то случайное 
и внешнее дополнение к закону, но характеризуемый как преобладающий во времена Энгельса 
случай европейского континентального нормативизма или англосаксонского прагматического 
казуализма, или метод прецедентного права (не будем затрагивать другие примеры правовых 
традиций)  - это один из первичных факторов, который можно по-настоящему назвать 
социальным существованием закона.
Самореализуемые гомогенизации бесконечно надстраиваются над неоднородной 
повседневной практикой в виде частичностей. Это судебный процесс как отдельная 
реальность-(ре)конструкця, в ходе анализа которого автор пришел к онтологизации 
переформулировки автопоэтической теории, которая первоначально была разработана 
в Чили для объяснения биологического воспроизводства клеток. В этой связи автор 
отмечает, что то, что утверждается как социальные структуры, является одновременно 
как воспроизводством, так и производством, своеобразным сочетанием сохранения и 
(ин)новации до того момента, когда они признаются своей социальной средой в качестве 
показательного образца для подражания и, таким образом, также аутентифицируются 
как заданные экземпляры реконвенционализации базовых традиций. Или – по закону – 
фактическое принятие решений может быть смоделировано только логикой решения 
проблемы, с относительно открытыми шансами и в относительно открытой справочной 
форме, над которой логика обоснования надстраивается только как дополнение к 
предыдущей фазе для последующего формирования, как своего рода обратная связь. 
Все это работает против обычных правовых теорий, которые, мечтая хоть о какой-
то механичности в следовании образцам, могут и готовы сообщать об осуществлении 
текстуальности права, его чистой реализации на практике. Опять же судебное решение 
определяется исходя из буквы закона (по аналогии с внутренней необходимостью химической 
экстракции), соответственно, поскольку «правильный ответ» получен, единственный и 
безальтернативный, никаких встроенных необходимостей здесь нет. Лукач, возможно, был 
того же мнения, так как он обозначил конфликт вовлеченных интересов при выполнении 
системы права [Verfüllungssystem] как обычную манипуляцию.
Так как понимание [Verständnis] само по себе является автопоэтическим процессом, в рамках 
общей схемы любого герменевтического процесса (если мы не рассматриваем робинзонское 
бытие, которое Лукач уже исключил) оно достигнет своей заданной формы в результате 
социальной игры (и ее простого существования [Gerade-So-Sein]) в определенной аудитории 
(Перельман). Так, в частности, каждый может принять участие и каждый может внести 
свой вклад в его формирование. Весь процесс приведет именно к тому результату, который 
до сих пор является оправданным в данной среде как фактическое разрешение конфликта 
вовлеченных интересов, только потому, что это то решение, которое еще может быть 
успешно конвенционализировано, т.е. признано и принято в данной среде с пониманием 
общепризнанных предрасположенностей как индивидуальной формы следования шаблону. 
Соответственно, личная ответственность за принятие решений (и в конечном счете 
ответственность каждого из нас) присутствует в каждом случае. На самом деле мы все 
несем ответственность, независимо от того, что, перекладывая нашу ответственность 
на квазиавтоматическую самостоятельную работу наших абстрактных структур, мы не 
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привыкли к тому, чтобы она была осознанной, в отличие от того, когда она приписывается 
нам лично.
Это связано с тем, что гомогенизация никогда не будет самодвижущейся: она 
подпитывается социальной неоднородностью. Так же как профессиональные языки 
черпают вдохновение из использования языка в рамках общей культуры и сами специалисты 
являются цельными людьми в полноте своего бытия, т.е. то, что известно как разделение 
прав [Ausdifferenzierung des Rechts] (Луман), может и должно быть реализовано на практике 
как это отражено в наших повседневных рассуждениях, т.е. в их интересах и – более 
того – для того чтобы просто реализовать их до оптимальной возможной степени.
В целом, мы неизбежно несем ответственность за себя и за нашу человеческую судьбу, 
включая вопросы «как и почему», а также автономию, которую мы даем нашим структурам, 
сделанным человеком на благо человека.
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